Lists of species underpin many fields of human endeavour, but there are currently no universally accepted principles for deciding which biological species should be accepted when there are alternative taxonomic treatments (and, by extension, which scientific names should be applied to those species). As improvements in information technology make it easier to communicate, access, and aggregate biodiversity information, there is a need for a framework that helps taxonomists and the users of taxonomy decide which taxa and names should be used (...) by society whilst continuing to encourage taxonomic research that leads to new species discoveries, new knowledge of species relationships, and the refinement of existing species concepts. Here, we present 10 principles that can underpin such a governance framework, namely (i) the species list must be based on science and free from nontaxonomic considerations and interference, (ii) governance of the species list must aim for community support and use, (iii) all decisions about list composition must be transparent, (iv) the governance of validated lists of species is separate from the governance of the names of taxa, (v) governance of lists of accepted species must not constrain academic freedom, (vi) the set of criteria considered sufficient to recognise species boundaries may appropriately vary between different taxonomic groups but should be consistent when possible, (vii) a global list must balance conflicting needs for currency and stability by having archived versions, (viii) contributors need appropriate recognition, (ix) list content should be traceable, and (x) a global listing process needs both to encompass global diversity and to accommodate local knowledge of that diversity. We conclude by outlining issues that must be resolved if such a system of taxonomic list governance and a unified list of accepted scientific names generated are to be universally adopted. (shrink)

We suggest a new view of secretory and membrane protein folding that emphasizes the role of pathways of biogenesis in generating functional and conformational heterogeneity. In this view, heterogeneity results from action of accessory factors either directly binding specific sequences of the nascent chain, or indirectly, changing the environment in which a particular domain is synthesized. Entrained by signaling pathways, these variables create a combinatorial set of necessary‐but‐not‐sufficient conditions that enhance synthesis and folding of particular alternate, functional, conformational forms. We (...) therefore propose that protein conformation is productively regulated by the cell during translocation across the endoplasmic reticulum (ER), a concept that may account for currently poorly understood aspects of physiological function, natural selection, and disease pathogenesis. BioEssays 24:741–748, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that Ted Poston's theory of explanatory coherentism is well-suited as a tool for causal explanation in the health sciences, particularly in epidemiology. Coherence has not only played a role in epidemiology for more than half a century as one of Hill's viewpoints, it can also provide background theory for the development of explanatory systems by integrating epidemiologic evidence with a diversity of other error-independent data. I propose that computational formalization of Hill's viewpoints in an explanatory (...) coherentist framework would provide an excellent starting point for a formal epistemological (knowledge-theoretical) project designed to improve causal explanation in the health sciences. As an example, I briefly introduce Paul Thagard's ECHO system and offer my responses to possible objections to my proposal. (shrink)

This essay presents textual evidence that Nietzsche’s slogan “Gott ist todt!” can be found in several texts of the later Middle Ages. Furthermore, it is argued that Nietzsche read one of these texts very early in his life – probably during the six years of his stay at Schulpforta – and that this may be one of the sources of his famous slogan. It is also shown how the slogan “God is dead!” could originate during the later Middle Ages.

Starting from a passage in the treatise De universali reali by Jean de Maisonneuve, where Jean de Maisonneuve denounces John Buridan as a materialist, the article looks for textual evidence that would support or otherwise refute this claim in Buridan’s works on natural philosophy. In particular, the article analyzes Buridan’s discussion of universal knowledge in the final redactions of his commentaries on Aristotle’s Physica and De anima, which turn out to complement each other. Here, Buridan asks if something extended and (...) material can have universal knowledge. Against the opinion commonly held, according to Buridan, not only by many of his contemporaries, but also by almost all of the ancient commentators, Buridan argues that traditional arguments against a materialistic theory of the human mind are not conclusive. After having removed the main stumbling blocks, he goes on to sketch a theory of universal knowledge that is compatible with the assumption that the human intellect is a material form. As an appendix, the paper contains an edition of the key question on universal knowledge in the penultimate redaction of John Buridan’s Physics commentary, which is made available in print for the first time here. (shrink)

Are we perhaps in the "matrix", or anyway, victims of perfect and permanent computer simulation? No. The most convincing—and shortest—version of Putnam's argument against the possibility of our eternal envattment is due to Crispin Wright (1994). It avoids most of the misunderstandings that have been elicited by Putnam's original presentation of the argument in "Reason, Truth and History" (1981). But it is still open to the charge of question-begging. True enough, the premisses of the argument (disquotation and externalism) can be (...) formulated and defended without presupposing external objects whose existence appears doubtful in the light of the very skeptical scenario which Putnam wants to repudiate. However, the argument is only valid if we add an extra premiss as to the existence of some external objects. In order to avoid circularity, we should run the argument with external objects which must exist even if we are brains in a vat, e.g. with computers rather than with trees. As long as the skeptic is engaged in a discussion of the brain-in-a-vat scenario, she should neither deny the existence of computers nor the existence of causal relations; for if she does, she is in fact denying that we are brains in a vat. (shrink)

Seeing that socio-legal theory has produced a number of compelling grand theories about law’s development as a body of knowledge, this contribution analyzes legal evolution on the micro-level of decision-making in concrete cases. To that end, law finding is reconstructed as a three stage process of reason-based rule-construction. Legal evolution is argued to stem from the argumentative jumps that are made in this process in order to use what is initially drawn from the body of legal knowledge in new cases. (...) These jumps are justified by additional reasoning that plays a crucial role in that it brings new information to the law finding process. It is explained how this new information gets incorporated in the body of knowledge as a result of discursive maneuvers of legal practitioners. (shrink)

In its reaction on the terroristic attacks of September 9th, 2001, the US-government threatened Afghanistan's Taleban with war in order to force them to extradite terrorist leader Bin Laden; the Taleban said that they would not surrender to this kind of blackmail – and so, they were removed from Kabul by means of military force. The rivalling versions of this story depend crucially on notions such as "terrorism" and "blackmail". Obviously you'll gain public support for your preferrend version of the (...) story if you are able to determine how those notions are to be used. So we had better reflect about their very meaning and about the moral implications of their proper usage. To gain a deeper understanding of our notions of "blackmail" and "terrorism" I shall propose an extreme thought experiment: Cassandra's plan. Cassandra foresees that sooner or later one of the nuclear powers might take the liberty to use atomic bombs. From fright she founds an NGO for blackmailing the statesmen who are in charge of nuclear weapons; she announces in public that all ministers and leaders of any government shall be hunted down, and executed, whose soldiers drop but one atomic bomb. (Cassandra's NGO keeps killer teams in constant training so as to increase the effect of the threat; this is being financiated from private donations). In my paper I shall raise two questions (without claiming to provide definite answers). First, would we have to say that Cassandra's NGO was a terrorist organisation? Second, would it be morally wrong if Cassandra blackmailed statesmen in the way indicated? (shrink)

Rarely does research in the history and philosophy of science lead to new empirical results, but that is exactly what has happened in one of the essays of this special issue: Rang and Grebe-Ellis have developed new experimental techniques to perform measurements Goethe proposed 217 years ago. These measurements fit neatly with Goethe’s idea of polarity—his complementary spectrum is not only an optical, but also a thermodynamical counterpart of Newton’s spectrum. I use the new measurements, firstly, to argue against the (...) asymmetries between light and darkness posited by Lyre and Schreiber; and, secondly, to explicate the alternative theory that Goethe had introduced to urge scientific pluralism. In my replies to exegetical criticism by Böhler, Hampe and Zemplén, I show that the main goal of Goethe’s Farbenlehre was indeed to expose symmetries between light and darkness. Furthermore, I argue that it is worthwhile to focus on the experiments, arguments and hypotheses of the Farbenlehre, and not merely on rhetorical, narrative or stylistical aspects, as Böhler and Hampe would have it. Goethe’s criticism of Newton is often dismissed, but it is in fact surprisingly relevant today. (shrink)

Randolph Bourne was only thirty-two when he died in 1918, but he left a legacy of astonishingly mature and incisive writings on politics, literature, and culture, which were of enormous influence in shaping the American intellectual climate of the 1920s and 1930s. This definitive collection, back in print at last, includes such noted essays as "The War and the Intellectuals," "The Fragment of the State," "The Development of Public Opinion," and "John Dewey's Philosophy." Bourne's critique of militarism and advocacy of (...) cultural pluralism are enduring contributions to social and political thought, sure to have an equally strong impact in our own time. In their introduction and preface, Olaf Hansen and Christopher Lasch provide biographical and historical context for Bourne's work. (shrink)

L'articolo presenta l'edizione di un gruppo di questioni sul numero, l'istante e il tempo discusse da Thomas Wylton in contesti teologici. Le questioni sono le seguenti: Q. 1 An numerus sit ens formaliter praeter animam ; Q. 2 An nunc secundum substantiam sit mensura propria rei generabilis et corruptibilis secundum esse permanens eius ; Q. 3: Utrum tempus habeat esse reale distinctum a motu secundum suum esse formale ; Q. 4: Utrum numerus qui oritur ex divisione continui addat aliquam rem (...) super continuum . L'edizione, riportata in appendice, è proceduta da una trattazione analitica di ciascuna questione, accompagnata da uno studio delle fonti. (shrink)

But We're American… The presence of American Exceptionalism in the Speeches of George W. Bush This paper defines American exceptionalism as the notion held by Americans that their country is unique and has a specific role to play in the world. The origins of this notion are traced to 17th century Puritan settlers, who used the metaphor of being "a city upon a hill" to highlight their position as a moral example to the rest of the world. This element from (...) a sacral religion was transformed during the founding of the United States into an element of civil religion, and as such the metaphor and concept of American exceptionalism received a political connotation. The rise of America's political power coincided with a more active role in world politics, which was backed with a rhetoric emphasising unity and America's unique role. The clash between the passive and the more active reading of the exceptionalist metaphor and the struggles between sacral and civil religion coincide during the presidency of George W. Bush. The presence of these elements of political rhetoric is surveyed in a corpus of speeches by President Bush. (shrink)

When Martha Montello took over as the Editor of Perspectives in 2014, she noted that the Journal had “flourished for 58 years because of its unique vision and mission and the ability of its remarkable editors to stay focused on that mission,” referring to the work of her predecessors, D. J. Ingle, Richard Landau, and Robert Perlman. Now we can add 10 more years to this fantastic track record of editorial excellence and count Martha herself among those to be credited (...) for this past success.Between 2014 and 2024, Martha Montello and our Managing Editor Solveig Robinson have improved the Journal appreciably by steadying the publication schedule, securing a high quality of publications, and recruiting outstanding guest... Read More. (shrink)

The CISG is now being applied extensively both by international arbitral tribunals and by domestic courts of its more than 70 contracting states. But do they also apply it in the same manner? Although Article 7 of the CISG underscores "the need to promote uniformity in its application", it gives little guidance as to how to achieve this goal. Each judge and arbitrator is influenced by the legal methodology of his home jurisdiction. Therefore it is somewhat of a paradox that (...) whilst the number of contracting states is constantly increasing so too is the threat of variation in application. In this book the most important issues of the CISG's methodology are analysed by leading experts from five continents. Whereas some authors provide a thorough analysis of the central topics of interpretation, others enter almost uncharted territories. (shrink)

Goethe's objections to Newton's theory of light and colours are better than often acknowledged. You can accept the most important elements of these objections without disagreeing with Newton about light and colours. As I will argue, Goethe exposed a crucial weakness of Newton's methodological self-assessment. Newton believed that with the help of his prism experiments, he could prove that sunlight was composed of variously coloured rays of light. Goethe showed that this step from observation to theory is more problematic than (...) Newton wanted to admit. By insisting that the step to theory is not forced upon us by the phenomena, Goethe revealed our own free, creative contribution to theory construction. And Goethe's insight is surprisingly significant, because he correctly claimed that all of the results of Newton's prism experiments fit a theoretical alternative equally well. If this is correct, then by suggesting an alternative to a well-established physical theory, Goethe developed the problem of underdete... (shrink)

Although Lorenz Oken is a classic example of Naturphilosophie as applied to biology, his views have been imperfectly understood. He is best viewed as a follower of Schelling who consistently attempted to apply Schelling's ideas to biological data. His version of Naturphilosophie, however, was strongly influenced by older pseudoscience traditions, especially alchemy and numerology as they had been presented by Robert Fludd, whose works were current in Jena and available to him. According to those influences, parts of Oken's philosophical conception (...) were communicable even in a non-idealistic scientific culture, for example in Paris, where Oken met Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. Geoffroy however was embedded in a French intellectual tradition, and the correspondence between his views and those of Oken was only superficial. The English anatomist Richard Owen attempted to incorporate the views of Oken and Geoffroy within his own, idiosyncratic system. Although Darwin knew of Oken's ideas, it was Geoffroy who really affected his evolutionary biology, and any influence of Oken must have been attenuated to the point of triviality. (shrink)

The stock market is an indicator of investor sentiment when it comes to new information or innovative firm-level products. Green bonds are both innovative and unique in terms of their higher information disclosures and understanding the impact of sustainable finance on investor outlook for a company’s stock. Using the comparative case of Mainland China and Hong Kong’s stock market, we examine whether green bond announcements from 2016 to 2019 can create significant investor reactions. By employing the event study methodology, we (...) confirm that both markets react in a positive way toward green bond announcements. This reinforces the reputational and financial benefits of green bonds. We find that issuers that are non-banks, environmentally friendly firms as well as those issuing non-general bonds, create a more positive reaction, whereas ownership aspects do not matter as much for investors. However, even among those issuers listed in both markets, certain institutional dynamics like strategic framing and source credibility tend to reinforce a firm’s institutional legitimacy and are seen as being more prominent for investor reaction. The policy implications of our study show that the stock market reaction among two connected economies, where previously varying institutional contexts have resulted in regional differences, are now equally supportive of sustainable financial markets like the green bond. As seen with the positive stock market sentiment, governments and listed issuers can now better align their policies and internal strategies, allowing the low-carbon transition to be a financially attractive opportunity for all investors. (shrink)

Independently and pursuing different aims, Hrushovski and Srour (On stable non-equational theories. Unpublished manuscript, 1989) and Baudisch and Pillay (J Symb Log 65(1):443–460, 2000) have introduced two free pseudospaces that generalize the well know concept of Lachlan’s free pseudoplane. In this paper we investigate the relationship between these free pseudospaces, proving in particular, that the pseudospace of Baudisch and Pillay is a reduct of the pseudospace of Hrushovski and Srour.

This essay outlines the history of Alexandrism in the Middle Ages, focusing on the reception of Alexander of Aphrodisias in the late-medieval universities. Alexander of Aphrodisias met with severe criticism in the 13th century from William of Auvergne, Albert the Great and Thomas of Aquinas among others, but in the 14th century this attitude changed completely with John Buridan, giving way to a positive and productive adoption of his theories. The centerpiece of the controversy was Alexander's doctrine that the human (...) soul is similar to the animal soul and hence mortal "like the soul of a dog or a donkey." Previously condemned as the absurd thesis of an outsider - wrongly so, because Alexander was perfectly in line with a long peripatetic tradition beginning with Dikaiarch of Messene and Straton of Lampsakos -, this doctrine was now considered philosophically superior to and sounder than the competing theories of Averroes and the Roman Catholic faith. In connection with this doctrine, Buridan stated that some higher species of animals have the ability to think like a man or an ape and that an ape can even be said to have some reason. Buridan's interpretation of Alexander was disseminated at the universities of the 14th and 15th centuries by his many followers, including Lawrence of Lindores, Marsilius of Inghen, Nicholas of Amsterdam, Biagio Pelacani of Parma and Benedikt Hesse of Kraków. (shrink)

Concepts of enlightenment were developed and transmitted to modern times. From that perspective, one has to understand classic and romanticism as a kind of culmination of European enlightenment, thereby describing romanticisms as a European phenomenon. Here, our ideas of freedom, personality and governance, the concept of science, the idea of rationality and, in particular, the disciplinarily defined rationality originated. It is the Kantian perspective, by which we now look on rationality. It is the Hegelian idea of system and coherence, we (...) test our hypothesis with, It is Baumgarten’s aesthetics, and it is the way, Fichte argued about the principle consequences of liberalization in French revolution that came into our discussions about jurisdiction, personal liberty, state and governance. And it is that new idea of an expert system driven rationality that we are accustomed to, in between. This form of rationality originated at the end of the 18th century and has been transferred in its essential methodological characteristics to our time. (shrink)

In relation to the Kantian theory that moral judgments are imaginarily grounded, this contribution explores how moral agents experience and make use of this imaginary groundedness. Drawing from a strand of aesthetics that conceives of imagination as make-believe, the imaginary ground of moral judgment is theorized to stem from the interaction between active participants who pretend that their claims are grounded, and passive participants who are invited to go along. Based on this reconstruction, the experience of the moral imaginary is (...) argued to stem from a divided mind. It allows moral agents to be partly devoted to the mental and communicative attitude fitting the fictional world of groundedness, and partly to generating personal responses to moral claims. Using the experience of artistic fiction as an example, the actual experience of morality’s imaginary ground is finally located in the interplay between those two spheres. (shrink)

Goethe carried out an enormous number of experiments before criticizing Newton's theory of light and colours in the Farbenlehre (1810). He managed to show that Newton's reasoning is based on a rather narrow choice of experiments, in which parameters such as the distance between the prism and the screen are fixed arbitrarily: Newton's famous spectrum (with its green centre) occurs only at a specific distance. Once you reduce the distance, the green centre disappears, and you see the two border spectra (...) instead. Newton can of course explain these border spectra; but things can be explained just as well the other way around: Then you start with a theory based on the two border spectra in order to derive the Newtonian spectrum. Both accounts fit many data (available in Newton and Goethe's days) equally well. Thus by insisting that the step to theory is not forced upon us by "reason and experiments" alone (as Newton would have it), Goethe revealed our own free, creative contribution to theory construction. And surprisingly, his theory of the prismatic colours seems no worse off than Newton's, even taking into account additional criteria of theory choice, such as simplicity or elegance. (shrink)

Let us imagine an ideal ethical agent, i.e., an agent who (i) holds a certain ethical theory, (ii) has all factual knowledge needed for determining which action among those open to her is right and which is wrong, according to her theory, and who (iii) is ideally motivated to really do whatever her ethical theory demands her to do. If we grant that the notions of omniscience and ideal motivation both make sense, we may ask: Could there possibly be an (...) ideal utilitarian, that is, an ideal ethical agent whose ethical theory says that our only moral obligation consists in maximizing utility? I claim that an ideal agent cannot be utilitarian. My reasoning against ideal utilitarianism will parallel Putnam's famous argument against the brains in a vat. Putnam argues that an envatted brain cannot describe its own situation because its words do not refer to brains and vats; I argue that an ideal utilitarian cannot entertain or communicate the beliefs necessary to being a utilitarian. (shrink)

Introduction The task of perusing the writings of Gilbert Porreta, and of endeavouring to comprehend the ideas expressed in them, is one whose difficulty ...

The authors of this article contend that traditional corruption, which was largely blamed for the current situation in the Icelandic economy, was perhaps not the most fundamental reason for the ensuing crisis. The weak business culture and a symbiosis of business and politics have actually allowed for the bulk of self-erving and unethical decisions made by the Icelandic business and political elite. In order to illustrate this point, 10 expert interviews have been conducted within the period of 6 months in (...) 2009 to support in-depth research carried out by the authors. The article also discloses questionable business practices that have recently come to the attention of the public both in Iceland and abroad and that ultimately facilitated the downfall of the Icelandic economy. While traditional corruption has probably played its role in this downfall, the measures currently employed to determine its level did not account for various peculiarities of Icelandic society. The article thus argues that there was a high level of corruption in Iceland, but it was outside of the traditional definition. This other corruption has ultimately prevented the government from acting appropriately upon the questionable business practices mentioned above. The article also offers some general recommendations which should be useful to both policy makers and business leaders wishing to engage in business activities in a transparent, ethical manner and learn from the tragic Icelandic experience. Among these recommendations are the necessity to recognize the limitations of current definitions of corruption, as well as a word of caution to commercial enterprises to pay a close attention not only to commonly accepted indices and mainstream reports but also to a country's history, culture, and political environment, prior to making any sort of investment decisions in that country. (shrink)

When it became uncool to speak of beauty with respect to pieces of art, physicists started claiming that their results are beautiful. They say, for example, that a theory's beauty speaks in favour of its truth, and that they strive to perform beautiful experiments. What does that mean? The notion cannot be defined. (It cannot be defined in the arts either). Therefore, I elucidate it with examples of optical experimentation. Desaguliers' white synthesis, for example, is more beautiful than Newton's, and (...) the many colourful syntheses done by Viennese painter Ingo Nussbaumer exemplify even greater beauty. Here are some criteria (which, of course, do not implement a decision procedure concerning beauty in experiments): cleanliness, simplicity, intellectual clarity, symmetry. Similar criteria are relevant to our aesthetical judgements about some pieces of music. So we can assume that our notion of beauty conserning art is related to the one conserning scientific experiments. (shrink)

Can we conceive of a mind without body? Does, for example, the idea of the soul's immortality make sense? Certain versions of materialism deny such questions; I shall try to prove that these versions of materialism cannot be right. They fail because they cannot account for the mental vocabulary from the language of brains in the vat. Envatted expressions such as "I think", "I believe", etc., do not have to be reinterpreted when we translate them to our language; they are (...) semantically stable. By contrast, physical expressions from the vat language are semantically instable; due to Putnam's externalism they cannot be transported to our language without change. This contrast opens the way to a new understanding of what the immortality of the soul might be like: A brain in a vat (and its mental life) might survive what the brain calls "my physical body's death". (shrink)

The analytic/synthetic distinction can be conceived from two points of view: from within or from without; from the perspective of one's own language or from the perspective of the language of others. From without, the central question is which sentences of a foreign language are to be classified as analytic. From within, by contrast, the question concerning the synthetic and the analytic acquires a normative dimension: which sentences am I not permitted to reject—if I want to avoid talking nonsense? Both (...) perspectives on analytic sentences do not mutually exclude but supplement and illuminate each other. In "Two Dogmas", Quine's criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction comes from within, whereas in Word and Object, Quine repeats his earlier criticism from without. His criticism is directed against Carnap's views on our understanding of theoretical terms. I challenge Quine's criticism in both of its versions and provide two definitions for analyticity that are immune to Quine's arguments. Using the first of these definitions (the one from without) I try to show how it is possible to distinguish (genuine) belief revision from linguistic change—even in case of a scientific revolution. (shrink)

Pacifists and their opponents disagree not only about moral questions, but most often about factual questions as well. For example, they came to divergent descriptions of the crisis in Kosovo. According to my reconstruction of pacifism, this is not a surprise because the pacifist, legitimately, looks at the facts in the light of her system of value. Her opponent, in turn, looks at the facts in the light of alternative systems of value, and the quarrel between the two parties about (...) supposedly descriptive matters does not come to an end as there is no objective reality about the war in question that could settle the issue. If I am right, the pacifist's value-laden way of looking at reality can be reconstructed as an obedience to three epistemic imperatives. First, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Human Nature ("Resist against demonizing the other side; always try to understand the case from their point of view"). Second, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Non-Violent Alternatives ("Always search for non-violent alternatives to projected military action"). Third, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Uncontrolled Escalation ("Sharpen your attention for uncontrolled, irreversible side effects of military action, particularly for the danger of escalation to another world war"). Objective reality does not decide how far one should go in following these imperatives. Rather, the decision about this is our's—similarly as in case of the scientist who decides to search for common deep structure behind the chaos of the manifold. So the pacifist's epistemic imperatives can be compared to Kant's regulative principles that are necessary for guiding the scientific scrutiny of reality. (shrink)

Two rival passions are at work in men's hearts to-day, the cult of individuality and the cult of society. They give rise all too often to extravagant praise of liberty and to a no less extravagant insistence on discipline for society's sake. It is impossible to form a balanced idea of the functions of liberty and discipline, or of the right relation between the individual and his social environment, without having a clear view of the nature of personality and community. (...) I offer a brief and dogmatic sketch of this subject. A personality is the product of the impact of the objective universe, past and present, on a particular experiencing subject. I do not wish to imply that a “subject” is necessarily a substance or a metaphysical ego, or an immortal soul. Whether such eternal individual spirits exist or not, I do not pretend to know. I do not even, by the word “subject,” pledge myself to what Professor Broad has called a “centred theory” of the nature of mind, I do not know whether a mind is a system of experiences united in an enduring centre, as the spokes of a wheel are united in the hub; or whether it is a centreless “net” of experiences all related together in a special way. By “subject” I mean only “that which experiences,” whatever the true philosophical account of it. I mean the seeming focus or centre of experience and action. This focus is in some sense located in time and space, in fact it is located within the organism. For my purpose the subject is simply that to which experience happens, and that which responds with conscious behaviour. I do not wish to raise the epistemological problem. I merely assume the rejection of solipsism, and the reality of an objective universe which the individual experiences, however imperfectly. (shrink)

This article investigates Kant's theory of the "sublime". It points out, that Kant's theory, which describes the intensive aesthetic feelings called forth by outstanding natural or artificial phenomena, like earthquakes, tempests or pyramids, is also extended to include a theory of death. Death, the ultimate and outstanding border of life, can also inspire this feeling of the sublime. But Kant, who prefers theories of immortality to theories of final death, manages to avoid this conclusion in his tree "critics". It was (...) let to his disciples to develop the theory of sublime death. (shrink)

It is shown that the method of operationaldefinition of theoretical terms applied inphysics may well support constructivist ideasin cognitive sciences when extended toobservational terms. This leads to unexpectedresults for the notion of reality, inductionand for the problem why mathematics is sosuccessful in physics.A theory of cognitive operators is proposedwhich are implemented somewhere in our brainand which transform certain states of oursensory apparatus into what we call perceptionsin the same sense as measurement devicestransform the interaction with the object intomeasurement results. Then, (...) perceivedregularities, as well as the laws of nature wewould derive from them can be seen asinvariants of the cognitive operators concernedand are by this human specific constructsrather than ontologically independent elements.. So, reality in so far it isrepresented by the laws of nature has no longeran independent ontological status. This isopposed to Campbell's `natural selectionepistemology'. From this it is shown that thereholds an incompleteness theorem for physicallaws similar to Gödels incompletenesstheorem for mathematical axioms, i.e., there isno definitive or object `theory of everything'.This constructivist approaches to cognitionwill allow a coherent and consistent model ofboth cognitive and organic evolution. Whereasthe classical view sees the two evolutionrather dichotomously. (shrink)